Singapore

18 February 2020



Singapore Budget 2020: Advancing as One Singapore

Howie Lee Economist +65 6530 1778 howielee@ocbc.com

- FY2020 overall budget balance is pencilled at a deficit of \$10.95bn (2.1% of GDP), more than our estimate of \$8.0bn (1.5% of GDP).
- \$6.4bn in total has been set aside to tackle the economic impacts from COVID-19 and the US-China trade war, including a \$800mn package dedicated to frontline staff in the healthcare industry.
- The GST rate hike from 7% to 9% has been delayed to 2022 to 2025, as priority is given to economic recovery at this stage.
- The recurring themes of upskilling financial support for needy families (especially in education and healthcare costs), childcare relief and climate change continue to dominate discussions.
- Overall, the expansionary budget policy was not unexpected given the US-China trade war, COVID-19 impacts and election anticipations.
 The announced measures should prove to be an encouraging boost for the economy as a whole, especially industries heavily affected by the coronavirus.

Backdrop: expansionary budget was highly expected since 2019

In light of slowing global economic growth since last year, economies around the world, including Singapore, were largely expected to roll out fiscal stimulus this year to spur economic growth. With the onset of COVID-19 threatening to derail the recovery the Singapore economy has been making since late 2019, an expansionary Budget 2020 was largely expected. The Singapore Government duly delivered, with a \$6.4bn package aimed at supporting industries affected by the COVID-19 and general economic slowdown.

Singapore

18 February 2020



Key Highlights

1. A timely expansionary budget amid economic uncertainty.

Prior to the budget release, PM Lee Hsien Loong had already cast a downbeat outlook on the Singapore economy as the COVID-19 situation continues to add headwinds to an already-fragile economy battered by the US-China trade war. A recession was not ruled out while MTI downgraded Singapore's 2020 growth forecast to -0.5% to 1.5% from 0.5% to 2.5%.

A total of \$6.4bn has been pencilled to help tackle the economic fallout brought about by the COVID-19 and lingering economic weakness from 2019, of which \$4bn is targeted at supporting industries via the Stabilisation and Support Package:

- \$800mn is set aside, mostly to the Ministry of Health, to aid frontline workers in their fight against the coronavirus.
- \$4bn to aid industries affected by both the coronavirus and the economy slowdown, including the Jobs Support Scheme and Wage Credit Scheme. This is in addition (but not limited) to property tax rebates for the tourism sector, rental rebates for the aviation industry, and support packages for the transport sector.
- \$1.6bn to households in defraying their costs of living, including (but not limited to) a one-time cash pay-out and other utility and grocery rebates.

The measures doled out to tackle the economic headwinds are well-timed and suitably aggressive. It sends a strong message that support from the government is available, which is likely to placate uncertainty among businesses that are heavily affected by the coronavirus outbreak.

2. GST hike to commence after 2021, but before 2025.

DPM Heng had already outlined plans to raise the GST rate from 7% to 9% in 2018. This was initially expected to take place as early as 2021, but has now been postponed to 2022 at the earliest. The GST hike will not be put off indefinitely however – it is expected to commence by 2025 at its latest.

The Singapore economy took a hard hit from the US-China trade conflict last year. Nascent emergence of economic green shoots in Q4 was quickly snuffed out by the COVID-19 outbreak. Japan also demonstrated the challenges in timing consumption tax increases — the country posted an annualized 6.3% GDP contraction in Q4 2019 on a quarterly basis. Amid the coronavirus situation and US-China tensions, it is probably prudent for Singapore to delay the implementation till 2022.

3. Ability to tackle downturn a result of consistent fiscal prudence.

The expected overall budget deficit of \$10.9bn in 2020 (2.1% of GDP) is the deepest deficit on record since data began in 1997. Nominally, the previous

Singapore

18 February 2020



record deficit was in 2015 (\$4bn) and as a percentage of GDP, the record deficit was in 2001 (1.7%). 2020's budget also exceeded our forecast of an \$8bn budget deficit (1.5% of GDP). A sizeable amount of expenditure this year is filed under Special Transfers: at \$21.98bn, it completely exceeded our expectations of \$15.7bn and is 44% larger than the previous year's.

The ability to dish out such a significant increase to Special Transfers – the \$4bn Stabilisation and Support Package is recorded under this segment – is hugely made possible due to the accumulation of surpluses since 2016. As the economy faced the double headwinds of the COVID-19 and the US-China trade war, it sorely needed fiscal stimulus to jolt growth out of its slump. The accumulation of surpluses since 2016 meant fiscal firepower was strong going into 2020, and the much-needed stimulus was duly delivered.

4. Long-term focus in digitalisation still remains

As part of the Government's vision of Singapore as a Global-Asia node of technology, innovation and enterprise, \$8.3bn has been set aside for the next three years to drive Singapore's transformation and growth strategy. In particular, the 5-fold rise in fintech investments has shown that enhancing digitalisation can pave the way for creating value. That looks to be the path that Singapore will continue pursuing for all industries in the medium to long term. \$300mn has also been set aside for deep-tech startups for emerging technology sectors such as pharmbio and medtech.

Conclusion: a feel-good budget designed to tackle short and long-term economic challenges

It is perhaps tempting to term Budget 2020 as election-friendly given the plethora of feel-good factors, but we think there is more than meets the eye. In an environment beset by low interest rates and trade protectionism, there was an urgency for the Singapore Government to dole out fiscal stimulus to shore up growth. The stimulus was duly delivered, in large part due to the accumulation of reserves from 2016. The cash hand-outs – ranging from the GST Assurance package to the Care and Support Package – will help to spur spending and consumption amid the COVID-19 outbreak. This is classical Keynesian economics at work and the economic support packages would have been welcomed under such a challenging environment – election year or otherwise.



18 February 2020



Treasury Research & Strategy

Macro Research

Selena Ling

Head of Research & Strategy LingSSSelena@ocbc.com

Head of Greater China Research

Tommy Xie Dongming

XieD@ocbc.com

Wellian Wiranto

Malaysia & Indonesia

WellianWiranto@ocbc.com

Terence Wu FX Strategist

TerenceWu@ocbc.com

Howie Lee

Thailand, Korea & Commodities HowieLee@ocbc.com

Carie Li

Hong Kong & Macau carierli@ocbcwh.com Dick Yu

Hong Kong & Macau dicksnyu@ocbcwh.com

Credit Research

Andrew Wong

Credit Research Analyst WongVKAM@ocbc.com **Ezien Hoo**

Credit Research Analyst EzienHoo@ocbc.com

Wong Hong Wei

Credit Research Analyst WongHongWei@ocbc.com Seow Zhi Qi

Credit Research Analyst ZhiQiSeow@ocbc.com

This publication is solely for information purposes only and may not be published, circulated, reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to any other person without our prior written consent. This publication should not be construed as an offer or solicitation for the subscription, purchase or sale of the securities/instruments mentioned herein. Any forecast on the economy, stock market, bond market and economic trends of the markets provided is not necessarily indicative of the future or likely performance of the securities/instruments. Whilst the information contained herein has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable and we have taken all reasonable care to ensure that the information contained in this publication is not untrue or misleading at the time of publication, we cannot guarantee and we make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness, and you should not act on it without first independently verifying its contents. The securities/instruments mentioned in this publication may not be suitable for investment by all investors. Any opinion or estimate contained in this report is subject to change without notice. We have not given any consideration to and we have not made any investigation of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of the recipient or any class of persons, and accordingly, no warranty whatsoever is given and no liability whatsoever is accepted for any loss arising whether directly or indirectly as a result of the recipient or any class of persons acting on such information or opinion or estimate. This publication may cover a wide range of topics and is not intended to be a comprehensive study or to provide any recommendation or advice on personal investing or financial planning. Accordingly, they should not be relied on or treated as a substitute for specific advice concerning individual situations. Please seek advice from a financial adviser regarding the suitability of any investment product taking into account your specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs before you make a commitment to purchase the investment product. OCBC Bank, its related companies, their respective directors and/or employees (collectively "Related Persons") may or might have in the future interests in the investment products or the issuers mentioned herein. Such interests include effecting transactions in such investment products, and providing broking, investment banking and other financial services to such issuers. OCBC Bank and its Related Persons may also be related to, and receive fees from, providers of such investment products.

This report is intended for your sole use and information. By accepting this report, you agree that you shall not share, communicate, distribute, deliver a copy of or otherwise disclose in any way all or any part of this report or any information contained herein (such report, part thereof and information, "Relevant Materials") to any person or entity (including, without limitation, any overseas office, affiliate, parent entity, subsidiary entity or related entity) (any such person or entity, a "Relevant Entity") in breach of any law, rule, regulation, guidance or similar. In particular, you agree not to share, communicate, distribute, deliver or otherwise disclose any Relevant Materials to any Relevant Entity that is subject to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2014/65/EU) ("MiFID") and the EU's Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (600/2014) ("MiFIR") (together referred to as "MiFID II"), or any part thereof, as implemented in any jurisdiction. No member of the OCBC Group shall be liable or responsible for the compliance by you or any Relevant Entity with any law, rule, regulation, guidance or similar (including, without limitation, MiFID II, as implemented in any jurisdiction).

Co.Reg.no.:193200032W